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FIVE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS ~-
Paul Cliteur1 
Advouates of human rights are not much concerned with systematic 
reflection on human rights and even less with criticism on the concept of 
human rights. Criticism of human rights comes from the dictators, the 
torturers, the people who trample on the fundamental rights of others, 
and - understandably - no scholar feels inclined to join their company. I 
hope I can avoid the impression that I have any sympathy for those who 
violate huinan rights. And yet, every tradition that wishes to remain vital 
has to adapt itself to the changing circumstances. Advocates of human 
rights cannot relax and lean over backwards, but from time to time they 
have to put to themselves annoying but extremely important questions 
like the following. How many human rights should we accept? Is there a 
limit? Is it advisable to rephrase discussions on world poverty in terms of 
human rights? Can judges, interpreting broad clauses of,)mman rights 
declarations contribute to the refugee problem or should /these political 
problems be solved in the democratic assemblies and by the usual 
political means? Do civil servants have the right to free speech or do 
they undermine the democratic system with opinions contradicting their 
political superiors? Should we, after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, 
eliminate the social and economic rights from the Universal Declaration 
that were comprised in that declaration as a compromise between East 
and West? And is the human rights tradition hopelessly anthropocentric 
with its insistence on human rights and its negligence of the interests of 
other inhabitants of this world? 
Annoying questions indeed. 
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In this paper, I want to introduce what seems to me a viable concept of 
human rights and subsequently point out some difficulties we have to 
cope with in the human rights tradition. My general aim is to sHtw that 
human rights have a promising future, but that we, scholars, should be 
careful in our dealings with human rights. We should be more careful 
than the politicians, the demagogues, the advocates of partial interests. 
What I advocate - in short - is a prudent and moderate approach to 
human rights. 
1 The concept of human rights 
But first some remarks on the concept of "human rights". To start with: 
the concept of "human rights" is very vague. In the broadest sense it can 
stand for every reference to an ideal. If the elimination of poverty in the 
world is a attractive ideal, you can proclaim a "right to food". If 
freedom of speech is an ideal, you can proclaim a "right to free speech". 
If "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is an attractive ideal, 
as utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham think it is, you can proclaim "the 
right to be happy". But in this broad sense, hu,rn~ rights evaporate in 
ordinary political and ethical speech. There is no real difference between · 
human rights and rights proclaimed in the classical natural law tradition. 
When legal scholars, in distinction to political activists, speak about 
human rights they usually refer to something more narrow and more 
pedestrian. They refer- I think- to: 
* fundamental rights 
* that are proclaimed in legal documents (constitutions or treaties) 
* that are protected by constitutional courts or the ordinary 
judiciary. 
* And because these human rights still have the ambition of being 
basic and universal, there still is the link with the tradition of 
natural law. 
How did this modern or legal concept of human rights come about? It is 
the product of a historical development. Five stages in this development 
present themselves to us. 
•,' . 
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1 The first stage: human rights as higher law 
The first stage of the development of human rights is the emergence of''t 
higher law. This is the period of higher law as na~ural law. A clear 
manifestation of the natural law thinking we find in Sophocles' play 
Antigone. 2 After some political events that are not necessary to rev !al 
here, Antigone decided to bury her brother. However, this burial was an 
evident refusal to obey the orders of the tyrant, holder of the legislative 
power in the state. 
To justify her act of defiance, she refers to higher law, divine law, a law 
that is superior to that of the tyrant. 
It did not end well with Antigone. The tyrant decreed that she should be 
burned alive. This did not happen, however, because she hanged herself. 
Her beloved, the son of the tyrant who spoke the death verdict, 
committed suicide (it was a real Greek tragedy). 
Antigone still lives, forth in books on jurisprudence because: 
(i) She makes a plea for higher law; 
(ii) This higher law is seen as something that limits the power and the 
competence of the king. 
/ 
This puts us on the track of the first characteristic of human rights. 
Human rights are higher law, that can be evoked in a conflict with the 
legislative power of the state. At this stage the tradition of human rights 
is still indistinguishable from that of natural law. Higher law is seen as 
something that is 'naturally' valid, or valid as the will of 'the gods' and 
not the will of man. 
Vgl. Weinreb, Lloyd L., Natural Law and Justice, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., London 1987, p. 7 ff. 
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2 Criticism on higher law 
But according to critics of the tradition of higher law this refmnce to 
broad ethical ideals is simply nonsense, nonsense upon stilts, in the 
famous phrase of Jeremy Bentham. · 
Bentham's pupil John Austin, the first lecturer in Jurisprudence 
formulated this criticism with great emphasis. He said: 
The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will 
of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. 
Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign 
under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, 
and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God ( ... ) the court 
of justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me 
up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity. An exception, 
demurrer, or plea, founded on the law of God was never heard in a Court of 
Justice, from the creation of the wol'ld down to the present moment. 
What Austin brings to our attention is a point that has been made time 
and again against the natural law tradition. 'Law', from the nature of the 
concept, is something 'made' or 'enacted'. All talklbout "natural law", 
law that has not been made, but that exists as the)stars and the trees, is 
nonsense. The only law that really exists is the law that has been made 
by the lawgiver, the legislative power. What is the use of a plea for 
higher law than the ordinary .law of every day? No use. When I trespass 
a law and I would justify my behaviour with the proposition that this law 
violates natural law the judge still will enforce the unjust positive law. 
The 'inconclusiveness of my reasoning' is made clear by 'hanging me 
up'. In fact, this is what happened with Antigone, and happens time and 
again with all the political convicts in the prisons of the world. Antigone 
committed suicide, but if not, surely the king would have spoke the death 
verdict. So what is the use of all that rhetoric about a higher law? 
To a certain sense this criticism on natural law is understandable and 
even justified. Jeremy Bentham and John Austin thought they had won 
their case. Reference to higher law than the ordinary law found in the 
usual statutes would simply vanish, they thought. But the idea of a higher 
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law proved to be an elusive idea. The tradition adapted itself and 
improved itself in the light of criticism that had been made by Bentham, 
Austin and other critics. The higher law tradition was· modified in sue~ 
way as to make it effective and give it practical significance. The 
shortcomings of classical natural law lead to the wish to make higher 
law: 
(i) visibl :; 
(ii) stable; 
(iii) and effective. 
This lead to a further development of the higher law tradition. 
3 The second stage: codified and entrenched higher law 
The second characteristic of human rights is that it is written law and as 
such is 'made visible'. Among others, the American colonists committed 
themselves to write down the principles that justified their separation 
from the British Empire. The Declaration of Independence ( 177 6) starts 
with the phrase: 
I 
When in the Course· of human events, it becomes netessary for one 
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with 
another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and 
equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle 
them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. 
The American colonists were dissatisfied about the rule of the British 
king, as Antigone was dissatisfied with the decrees of the Greek tyrant. 
Subsequently, they declared themselves independent and not bound to 
the laws that were laid down by the tyrant. ' 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
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This was 1776. In 1787 the Americans adopted a constitution with 
entrenched clauses. So, historically, we have now higher...,law, made 
visible and stable against the whims of the moment. 9:: 
4 The third stage: judicial review 
The third stage in the development of human rights is the introduction of 
judicial review as a means to make higher law effective. John Marshall, 
chief Justice in the American Supreme Court, presented the argument to 
adopt judicial review as an essential part of the tradition of higher law. 
This was in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison. Marshall said: 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may 
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are 
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if 
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The 
distinction, between government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, 
if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts 
prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. ,; 
/ 
And then the famous words follow: "It is a proposition too plain to be 
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to 
it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by any ordinary act". 
These words were of great significance for the modern concept of higher 
law. Marshall integrated judicial review as an essential element of the 
modern concept of higher law and of human rights. 
In 1803 the modern concept of human rights was almost finished. Since 
then, little serious improvement has been made. The only important 
development was perhaps the universalization of the human rights idea. 
The rights enshrined in the American constitution were right for 
Americans. 
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5 The fourth stage: universalization of the human rights idea 
After the Second World War the fourth stage in the development of the 4 
modern concept of human rights came to the fore: the universalization of 
the human rights idea. A declaration of rights was presented with a 
universal pretension: in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was adopted. This declaration was proclaimed as a "common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations". The notion of universality 
is evident from this choice of words. But there was a second remarkable 
dimension to the Universal Declaration that was a further development of 
the American ideas: the Universal Declaration is founded on the idea of 
human dignity. This was new. Never in the history of mankind was 
higher law proclaimed on no other basis than human dignity. All the 
previous declarations were presented as the expressions of the will of 
God. 'All men are created equal', the Declaration of Independence 
states. But the Universal Declaration was a-theistic in the sense that no 
reference to the will of God was made. The Sina'i-model that we find in 
Moses receiving the commandments of God was in 1948, for the first 
time in world history, abandoned. The Dutch protested against the 
secularist foundation of the Universal Declaration, I have Jo confess 
reluctantly. But Father Beaufort, our representative in 'fhe United 
Nations, committed to the task of adopting the Declaration, found no 
political support for his wish to refer to the will of God as the foundation 
of modern human rights. Atheist nations like the Soviet Union, Poland 
and China objected to this idea, and we can be very happy with this 
refusal of those marxist states. Because this elimination of a reference to 
the god of only one part of humanity made the universal aspirations of 
the Declaration possible. 
So much for the development of the modern human rights idea. Let us 
now consider whether there are any tensions in this idea; whether there 
are contradictions to be solved, developments to'be expected. 
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6 The modern concept of human rights: the End of History? 
Ten years ago the American political philosopher Francis ~uyama 
presented a thesis on the 'End of Ideology' and also the 'End of 
History'. According to Fukuyama, a kind of world-wide ideological 
hegemony has emerged. Everyone agrees that capitalism is the key to 
human liberty and human prosperity, Fukuyama states. And everyone 
also agrees that democracy and the rule of law are the best ways to 
organise political decision making. Liberal democracy is the final stage 
of political development. Like Hegel more than hundred years ago, 
Fukuyama meant that the liberal ideas that are prevalent in our time are 
the final destination of world history. That does not mean that all the 
particular regimes in the real world implement these ideals fully, but 
only "that their theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved 
upon".3 
It is tempting to compare the thesis of Fukuyama with our historical 
development of the modern concept of human rights. Can we say that the 
human rights concept is really finished? Is the idea of fundamental and 
universal rights, that are proclaimed in legal doclfll'lents, and protected 
by the courts a 'theoretical truth' that can not be; improved upon? Are 
there any new developments to expect? 
Of course, we can argue about the amount of rights we should elevate to 
the status of 'human rights'. We can advocate the adoption of the 
declaration by all the nations of the world community. But these are not 
significant developments of the stature as the four stages outlined before. 
The question is whether there are great problems with the modern 
concept of human rights that have to be solved like the problems posed 
by Bentham and Austin were challenges that the human rights tradition 
had to overcome. 
Cf. Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History?", in: in: The National Interest, 
Summer 1989, also in: Paul Schumaker, Dwight C. Kiel, Thomas W. Heilke, 
eds., Ideological Voices. An Anthology in Modern Political Ideas, The McGraw-
Hill Companies, Inc. New York etc. 1997, pp. 409-417, p. 412. 
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I believe the central problem for the modern concept of human rights is 
the tension of human rights with democracy. This is a tension, of course, 
that only manifests itself in democracies. Where there is autocratic rule 
human rights are not treat to democracy. But in democracies, like many 
European countries and the Uninvited States, there is a real tension 
between human rights and democracy. 
Advocates for hl man rights usually feel somewhat surprised to hear that 
there is a tension between democracy and human rights. They are 
accustomed to think of human rights in rosy terms. Human rights are 
good. Democracy is good. So human rights should perfectly match with 
democracy. Yet, a little reflection on the modern concept of human 
rights can make us realise that there is some tension in the idea of a 
aristocratic council or even 'priesthood'4 of- in the case of the Supreme 
Court- "Nine old Men" (at the moment also women) striking down the 
decisions of democratically chosen assemblies.5 Some people tried to 
present "solutions" for this problem. 
First, one has presented the semantic solution. They said: "Democracy is 
not simply majority rule but also respect for the .rights of minqrities". 
But this is a semantic solution indeed. The tension remains that a;kind of 
priestly caste can 'legislate' for the legislature without any democratic 
qualifications. 
Second, people presented the constitutionalist solution. Human rights are 
proclaimed in constitutions and treaties. Usually a constitution is the 
product of intense debate and discussion. The whole community is 
Cf. Taylor, Richard, "The American Judicary as a Secular Priesthood", in: 
Richard Taylor, Reflective Wisdom. Richard Taylor on Issues That Matter, Edited 
by John Donnelly, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York 1989, pp. 155-171. 
Very critical is the conservative scholar and judge: Bork, Robert H., Slouching 
towards Gomorrah. Modern Liberalism and American Decline, Harper Collins, 
New York 1996; Bork, Robert H., The Tempting of America, The Political 
Seduction of the Law, Sinclair-Stevenson, London 1990. But some left-wing 
scholars are of the same opinion: Rodell, Fred, Nine Men, A Political History of 
the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955, Random House, New York 1955. 
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involved in a kind of heightened political debate. 6 There is nothing 
undemocratic reminding the community to the choices they onc~ade in 
their constitution. The constitutional judge is nothing else as the 'living 
oracle of the law'. 
Third, people presented the traditionalist solution. They said: 
"Democracy is also commitment to long term perspectives of a cultural 
community and human rights are the product of a long term democracy. 
This generation has no right to violate the decisions of our forefathers. 
The individual is foolish, the species is wise" .712 
All three 'solutions' for the tension between human rights and 
democracy, the counter-majoritarian dilemma as the Americans call it, 
have some relevance, but they ease the tension and do not eliminate it 
completely. We have to realise that every time we raise an ordinary right 
in the elevated mode of "human rights" we take away power from the 
political branches and place it in the hand of a very small minority: the 
(constitutional) judges. In the time of John Marshall this was not 
considered to be a big problem. But this was the ti19e when the judiciary 
was the 'least dangerous branch' . 8 Nowadays this )situation has changed 
considerably. An enormous proliferation of human rights has made the 
judiciary the foremost political force in the modern state. Every time we 
introduce new rights, a first generation,. a second generation, a third 
generation - every time we must ask ourselves: 'Is the system still in 
balance?'. 
So my advise to scholars dealing with human rights would be: 'Do not 
only think about the utopian world you want to realise, but also think 
Cf. Bailyn, Bernard, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 
Enlarged Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England 1992 (1976). 
This is Burke, of course, (Reflections on the revolution in France, ed. Conor 
Cruise O'Brien, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1982), but also: Chesterton, 
G.K., Orthodoxy, Third edition, John Lane, London New York s.a. 
Federalist papers, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton en John Jay, edited by 
Isaac Kramnick, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1987, No. 78. 
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about the legal system in which human rights have to function'. Or even 
more provoking: "Think about the amount of human rights that .J· 
democracy can endure". Scholars should think about checks ana 
balances, about the desirable relation between the legislative power and 
the judicial power. I believe, the history of the American Supreme Court 
should be compulsory reading for those who advocate the 
implementation of human rights in European legal systems. 9 It is here 
that we can find all the problems with the implementation of higher law 
in a democracy. 
Personally I am optimistic about the prospects for the future. It must be 
possible to develop a prudent way of using the concept of human rights. 
We should learn from the American notion of 'restraint'. Restraint from 
the side -of the legislative: not every sympathetic ideal should be 
proclaimed as a human right. Restraint from the side of the judges: not 
every sympathetic idea should be read into the broad clauses of human 
rights declarations! So we also have to reflect on the notion of 'judicial 
interpretation' . But if such an 'integral' study of human rights with 
contributions of political scholars, philosophers, legal scholars is 
practiced, it will be possible to maintain the right core of what human 
rights can signify in democracies and also to make furthep1 developments 
in the concept. 
\ 
Cf. Bickel, Alexander M., The Least Dangerous Branch, The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics, The Bobbs-Merill, Indianapolis, New York 1962; Savage, 
David, Turning Right. The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court, John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., New York etc. 1992; Simon, James F., The Center Holds. The 
Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Court, Simon & Schuster, New York etc. 
1995; Schwartz, Bernard, A History of the Supreme Court, Oxford University 
Press, New York/Oxford 1993. 
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